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Abstract
Harbaugh (1998a) has shown theoretically that charities can increase the size of
donations by publicly acknowledging their donors using categories. In a comple-
mentary paper, using the data on the donations given by 146 lawyers to their alma
mater law school, Harbaugh (1998b) provided empirical support for this theoretical
assertion. Essentially, being acknowledged in categories gives donors some prestige
bene￿ts. In this paper, we experimentally investigate the impact of various reporting
plans as described in Harbaugh (1998a and 1998b) on the behavior of donors. Our
results show that, although the category reporting plan has no signi￿cant impact on
the size of donations when compared to the exact reporting plan and the no reporting
plan, it does signi￿cantly alter the charitable behavior of donors. We show that the
presence of a category reporting plan induces the clustering of donations on the lower
boundaries of categories, which suggests that donors are motivated by prestige. We
also discover that in some circumstances the presence of prestige bene￿ts crowds out
the warm glow motive for giving.
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11 Introduction
In the discourse of economics, human beings are typically seen as rational self-interested
individuals seeking to maximize their utility, a utility derived from direct material payo⁄s.
However, in reality human beings do not always behave in that manner. Many of them are
willing to give away some of their hard-earned income to charitable causes. For instance,
in 2007 Americans donated around US$300 billion to charities. This sum is roughly
equivalent to about 1.64% of the US gross national income. Most of these donations came
from individual donors (BBC News, 23 June 2008). Likewise, in other countries, despite
the varying levels of tax and welfare schemes, it has been well documented that people
care about giving to charitable causes (Charities Aid Foundation, 2006).
This apparent inconsistency between the pursuit of individual utility maximization
postulated by economic theories and the philanthropic behavior seen in real life has at-
tracted much academic attention. Some possible explanations have been suggested. Kolm
(1969), Warr (1982), Roberts (1984), and Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) argued
that people were altruistic. They did inherently care about the well-being of others and
obtained positive utility from the public bene￿ts that their donations gave rise to. An-
dreoni (1989 and 1990) argued that the pursuit of public bene￿ts could not be the only
motive for giving. In addition to public bene￿ts, individuals might also obtain direct
private bene￿ts from the act of donating itself and would therefore donate in order to
obtain these bene￿ts. Andreoni (1989 and 1990) coined the term ￿warm glow bene￿t￿to
describe this phenomenon.
Apart from warm glow bene￿t, there are other types of non-monetary private bene￿t
that may motivate people to donate. Hollander (1990) pointed to the importance of
receiving social approval as a motive for giving. The extent of social approval crucially
depends on the di⁄erence between one￿ s own donations and the average donations of others
in the reference group. Glazer and Konrad (1996) argued that individuals contributed
to charities in an attempt to signal their wealth to others. Using contributions as a
signal may be seen as more socially acceptable than using other types of signal, such
as, for instance, conspicuous consumption. Harbaugh (1998a and 1998b) stressed the
importance of prestige in motivating individuals to donate, the prestige being derived
from donors having their donations made known to others. In these papers, he argued
2that, if indeed donors were motivated by prestige and the objective of charities was to
maximize donations, charities could design a fundraising strategy that endowed donors
with prestige. Harbaugh demonstrated that reporting donations in categories could realize
such a strategy.
With the category-reporting plan, charities publicly announce individual donations
according to pre-speci￿ed categories that are ranked according to the size of the donation.
Those who donate a sum lower than the lowest amount in the lowest category will not have
their donations publicly announced, and those who donate an amount that falls within a
certain category will have their donations announced and given a certain status. There are
many examples of this fundraising strategy in operation. For instance, The Illinois Valley
Symphony Orchestra categorizes donors based on the size of their donations.1 Donors are
given a status as a contributor, sponsor, patron, guarantor, or sustainer if they donate
amounts of, respectively, $25-$49, $50-$99, $100-$249, $250-$499, or over $500. Another
example is Multiple Births Canada, a Canadian-based charity organization that provides
support for multiple birth families and individuals in Canada.2 Donors are given a status
as a donor, supporter, friend of MBC, contributing member, sustaining member, patron,
or founding member if they donate amounts of, respectively, $1-$249, $250-$499, $500-
$999, $1,000-$4,999, $5,000-$9,999, $10,000-$29,999, or over $30,000.
Using data on donations given by 146 lawyers to their alma mater law school, Har-
baugh (1998b) found empirical evidence showing that donors were indeed motivated by
prestige and that the use of category reporting could increase the size of donations. Har-
baugh￿ s paper is the only empirical paper to date that systematically evaluates the impact
of the widely used category reporting plan on the size of donations and empirically iden-
ti￿es the existence of a prestige motive for giving. The lack of empirical evidence suggests
that it is di¢ cult to empirically control for the relevant confounding factors and to isolate
the impact of prestige on giving.
Some scholars have therefore resorted to an experimental approach as an alternative
veri￿cation tool. Andreoni and Petrie (2004) evaluated the use of fund-raising strategies
that involved reporting the size of donations and revealing the identity of donors visually in
laboratory experiments. They designed experimental treatments that allowed for the size
1See http://www.ivso.org/ for more information.
2See http://www.multiplebirthscanada.org/ for more information.
3of donations to be reported either exactly or by contribution categories. They showed
that unmasking the identity of donors and using contribution categories increased the
value of contributions. Soetevent (2005) presented a ￿eld experimental study on religious
o⁄erings in 30 Dutch churches. In the Netherlands the methods employed to collect
o⁄erings vary between churches. Some of them use closed collection bags and some others
use open collection baskets. Churchgoers can observe the size of o⁄erings made by others
when open collection baskets are used. The use of open collection baskets can thus
potentially provide social incentives for churchgoers. The study did indeed show that
the size of contributions was signi￿cantly higher when open collection baskets were used.
In a laboratory experiment, Rege and Telle (2004) examined the impact of revealing the
identities of contributors in a public good game on the size of contributions. They showed
that revealing the identity of contributors increased the size of contributions.
Our paper also presents an experimental study on the role of prestige in stimulating
people￿ s incentive to contribute. However, in contrast to the related papers noted above,
this paper focuses on the role of category reporting plans as outlined by Harbaugh (1998a
and 1998b) and provides an experimental test of his theoretical assertions. In a series of
experiments conducted at Fudan University in China, we compared the impact of various
reporting strategies on the behavior of donors. Participants were undergraduate and
graduate students with various faculty backgrounds. Our results show that, relative to our
benchmark plan in which contributions were not publicly announced and full anonymity
was preserved, the use of category reporting has an insigni￿cant impact on the size of
donations. However, it does change people￿ s charitable behavior. We show that people
tend to donate an amount that is equal to the lower boundary of the stated categories.
We also show that donors do not behave this way when donation categories are used but
contributions are not announced. This result thus provides supporting evidence of the
existence of a prestige motive for giving.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie￿ y discusses the Harbaugh model and
its predictions. Section 3 describes our experimental design. Section 4 discusses our main
results. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
42 The Harbaugh Model
Harbaugh (1998a) assumed that donors cared about warm glow, which is the utility
derived from the act of giving itself, and prestige, which is the utility derived from having
the amount of their donation and the category into which it falls known to others. These
are both private bene￿ts of giving and independent of how much others donate. Since
a warm glow bene￿t arises from the act of giving itself, it cannot be exploited by the
charity. Prestige bene￿ts, on the other hand, can be exploited by the charity since they
are only obtained by donors when their donations are publicly announced.
The model assumes that donors ignore the public bene￿ts of giving. Harbaugh (1998a)
o⁄ered two plausible justi￿cations for this assumption. Firstly, he argued that small
populations were often large enough to diminish the e⁄ect of an individual￿ s donation on
public bene￿ts to a negligible level. Secondly, many public goods provided using donations
do not directly bene￿t donors. For instance, donors who contribute to the relief e⁄ort
extended to the victims of a natural disaster taking place far away from their country do
not get any direct public bene￿ts from their donations. Likewise, donors who donate to
Multiple Births Canada, the non-pro￿t organization mentioned previously, could possibly
be childless parents or parents without twins who will not obtain direct public bene￿ts
from the public goods provided by the organization.
It is also assumed in the model that warm glow and prestige bene￿ts are independent
of social interactions. It is true that a donor may care about his or her social status and is
in￿ uenced by the donations of others. However, in the simultaneous contribution setting
adopted by the model, donors cannot observe the donations of others when making their
own donations, and consequently the warm glow and prestige bene￿ts are not going to be
a⁄ected by social interactions.3
Donors have the following utility function, U = U (x;p;d), which is increasing and
concave in its arguments. Note that x denotes the consumption of private goods, p
denotes the amount of prestige bene￿t, and d denotes the warm glow bene￿t. The budget
constraint is given by m = d + x. It is assumed that there is no income taxation and
3In a sequential contribution setting, Vesterlund (2003) shows that past donations can be used as
a signal of the quality of a charity when donations are made sequentially. A high quality charity will
therefore always announce past donations and be able to obtain larger donations. See also Romano and
Yildirim (2001) and Potters, Sefton and Vesterlund (2005) for studies that look at sequential contribution
setting and the impact of announcement of past donations on subsequent donations.
5that donations are not tax deductible. The prices of private goods and donations are
normalized to 1. The utility function can then be re-written as U = U (m ￿ d;p;d) =
V (p;d;m):
For a given income and utility level, and for all pairs of p and d, we have the indi⁄erence
curve shown in Figure 1 for example. The slope of the indi⁄erence curve, which is equiv-
alent to the marginal rate of substitution between d and p, is ￿ 1
@U=@p (@U=@d ￿ @U=@x).
Before the in￿ ection point we have @U=@x < @U=@d. An increase in d and a decrease in
x will increase the total utility. Therefore, p must decrease in order to maintain the same
utility level. After the in￿ ection point we have @U=@x > @U=@d, which implies that an
increase in d and a decrease in x will decrease the total utility. In order to maintain the
same utility level, p must increase. An increase in income m will shift the indi⁄erence
curve to the right, while an increase in the utility level will shift the indi⁄erence curve
upward.
The charity makes a public report ri about the size of individual i￿ s donation d, and
upon observing the report the society rewards this individual with prestige according to
pi = pi(￿;ri(di)), in which 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1 denotes the sensitivity of prestige to reporting. The
relationship between p and d is shown in Figure 1.
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
A charity can employ any one of the following reporting plans. The ￿rst is the no
reporting plan (NR), in which the charity does not report the size of the donations made
by the donors. The second is the exact reporting plan (ER), in which the charity reports
the exact size of the donations made. The third is the category reporting plan (CR),
in which the charity reports the size of the donations made by the donors in terms of
the category they fall into. The charity sets the minimum sum required for a donation
to fall into a certain category. The size of prestige bene￿t obtained from the donation
of a certain sum di⁄ers between reporting plans. However, the amount of warm glow
bene￿t obtained is independent of the reporting plan. As a utility-maximizing individual,
a donor responds di⁄erently to di⁄erent reporting plans. Donors will adjust their optimal
donations according to the reporting plan used.
The No Reporting Plan (NR)
6Under the NR plan, the charity does not report the donations of individuals. Individ-
uals are confronted with an anonymous donation campaign and therefore will not obtain
any prestige. They choose an optimal amount to donate d0 (see Figure 1).
The Exact Reporting Plan (ER)
Under the ER plan, the charity publicly reports the exact amounts donated by in-
dividuals. Thus, we have r = d. Donors translate the report made by the charity into
prestige according to the relationship, p = ￿d. The sensitivity of prestige p to reporting ￿
increases with factors that could add value to the report made by the charity, such as the
fame, credibility, scale, and goodwill of the charity. Donors choose an optimal amount to
donate de (see Figure 1). Note that we have d0 < de, which implies that the ER plan
yields more donations than the NR plan.
The prestige line given by the ER plan and the indi⁄erence curve attained by the
NR plan under the optimal size of donations d0 intersect at two points given by the
size of donations dm￿and dm respectively. A donor will be indi⁄erent to whether he or
she donates d
0
m under the ER plan or d0 under the NR plan. Likewise, a donor will be
indi⁄erent to whether he or she donates dm under the ER plan or d0 under the NR plan.
The Category Reporting Plan (CR)
Under the CR plan, the charity sets the threshold minimum amount for each category.
Suppose that the charity only uses one category and the minimum amount of donations
to reach this category is set equal to db. Donors who donate an amount below this thresh-
old do not get their donations reported publicly and thus will not obtain any prestige.
Donors therefore choose an optimal amount for their donation that is exactly equal to the
minimum category threshold db (see Figure 1).
When the minimum category threshold is set such that db < d0, donors will ignore
the category and donate an amount of d0. This is because donating db gives them a lower
utility than donating d0. When the threshold is set such that d0 ￿ db < de , donors will
donate an amount of db. This amount is larger than that received under the NR plan,
but is lower than that received under the ER plan. When the threshold is set such that
de ￿ db < dm, donors will donate an amount of db. This amount is larger than that
received under either the NR or the ER plan. Finally, when the threshold is set such
that dm ￿ db, donors will ignore the category and donate an amount of d0, which is equal
7to the optimal size of donation received under the NR plan, and also captures the warm
glow motive for giving.
All in all, on the basis of the above model, we have the following empirical predictions:
1) the ER plan yields more donations than the NR plan; 2) the CR plan does not yield
fewer donations than the NR plan; 3) the CR plan may yield more or fewer donations
than the ER plan, depending on the size of the minimum threshold category db; and 4),
under the CR plan, donors will donate an amount that is equal to the minimum threshold
category db.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
We designed and conducted a series of laboratory experiments to verify the empirical
predictions of the Harbaugh model.4 Our experiments were carried out at Fudan Univer-
sity in China.5 Our participants were undergraduate and graduate students from various
faculty backgrounds. They were recruited through a campus-wide bulletin board system.
Altogether, we had 141 participants consisting of 51 males and 90 females. In terms of fac-
ulty backgrounds, we had 76 participants from the Faculty of Arts, 35 participants from
the Faculty of Science and Engineering, and 28 participants from other faculties such
as Business, Law, and Computing. Of these 141 participants, 98 were undergraduate
students and 43 graduates.
We employed four di⁄erent reporting plans, namely 1) the NR plan, 2) the ER plan,
3) the CR plan, and 4) the category no reporting (CNR) plan. The CNR plan is a
variant of the CR plan without public announcement. Under this plan, we only inform
donors privately about the category in which their donations qualify. Essentially, this
scheme retains the use of category plan, but removes the prestige channel. Two levels of
endowment, i.e. RMB 20 and RMB 50, were given to the participants. We only used
one donation category (i.e. the star donor status) for the CR and CNR plans, but we
varied the minimum size of donation required to qualify for this category. We used the
minimum amounts of RMB 5, RMB 8, RMB 12, and RMB 16 for the CR and CNR
4The experimental instructions, in both the original language (Chinese) and the Eng-
lish version, are available upon request from authors. They can also be downloaded from
http://www.expernomics.com/yer/research.htm.
5Prior to conducting the main experiments, we carried out a pilot experiment at the National Uni-
versity of Singapore with 23 participants recruited among undergraduate students from various faculty
backgrounds.
8plans with the endowment level of RMB 20, and RMB 5, RMB 20, RMB 30, and RMB
40 for the CR and CNR plans with the endowment level of RMB 50. All in all, we had 10
di⁄erent treatments for each endowment level. Each participant randomly selected one
treatment as the binding treatment to determine his or her compensation at the end of
the experiment. Table 1 below summarizes all treatments and their respective codes used
in our analysis.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
In the above table, for instance, CR20_1 (5 ￿ 20) denotes the CR plan 1 with a
minimum threshold of RMB 5 and an endowment level of RMB 20. The remaining
codes are de￿ned in a similar manner.
Each participant had to decide how much of his or her endowment to donate and
how much of it to keep. We conducted 6 experimental sessions, and we systematically
distributed all 10 x 2 treatments that we had across these 6 sessions. Table 2 below
illustrates the allocation of treatments across sessions and the number of participants
involved in each session. The numbers added in front of the treatment codes represent
the sessions. Thus, for instance, 3_CR2_1 (5 ￿ 20) refers to the CR plan 1 treatment
with the minimum threshold of RMB 5 and the endowment level of RMB 20 that was
conducted in session 3. Note that we randomized the sequence of treatments faced by the
participants in each session to avoid any anchoring e⁄ect.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
The presence of prestige e⁄ect could be deduced from pairwise comparisons between:
1) CR and CNR plans, 2) ER and NR plans, and 3) CR and NR plans. In the CR and
CNR plans, participants were informed that when they donated an amount that was at
least equal to the minimum threshold amount, they would be given ￿star donor￿status.
In the CR plan, the status and identity of donors were publicly announced at the end
of the session. In contrast, in the CNR plan, the status of donors was kept con￿dential.
Any signi￿cant di⁄erence in the size of donations between these two plans could therefore
be attributed to the prestige e⁄ect.
9Next, the main di⁄erence between the ER and the NR plans was the presence of
a public announcement of the exact size of donations given by each donor. All other
things being equal, if the ER plan resulted in larger donations than the NR plan, then
the additional size of donations obtained under the ER plan could also be attributed to
the prestige e⁄ect. Finally, the main di⁄erences between the NR and CR plans were
the presence of category reporting and the public announcement of donations. The model
predicts that, as long as the minimum threshold category is set appropriately, there should
be a greater number of donations under the CR plan than under the NR plan, if the donors
care about prestige.
By examining the donation pattern of the donors under the NR plan, we were able
to observe some natural sizes of donation (i.e. focal points). These focal donation points
under the NR plan captured the warm glow motive of giving.
The main di⁄erence between the NR plan and the CNR plan was the presence of
categories. Since the prestige channel was muted under the CNR plan, we expected that
there should be no di⁄erence in the size of donation obtained under either plan. Thus,
under the CNR plan, donors should donate an amount equal to any of the existing focal
points found under the NR plan.
However, the use of categories under the CNR plan could also possibly have provided
a reference point to donors concerning how much to donate. If this was indeed the case,
we might have expected that the donors would donate an amount equal to this reference
point rather than to any of the natural focal points. Consequently, we would have seen
di⁄erent donation patterns under both the NR and CNR plans. Whether or not the CNR
plan would have generated more donations than the NR plan depended on the minimum-
threshold category. If this was set too low, the size of donation was going to be lower
under the former than under the latter.
Finally, under both ER and CR plans donations were publicly announced; however,
the announcements were made in di⁄erent ways. With ER, information on the exact size
of donations was provided, while in the latter, only information on those donations that
fell within the category was given. The Harbaugh model shows that whether or not the
CR plan yields more donations than the ER plan depends on the size of the minimum
threshold category to qualify for star donor status.
10We ran both between-subject and within-subject analyses. We used the data from the
NR treatment conducted in session 1, the ER treatment conducted in session 2, the CR
treatments conducted in sessions 3 and 4, and the CNR treatments conducted in sessions
5 and 6 in our analysis. In Table 2, we indicate all the treatments used in the analyses in
bold fonts.
In the laboratory, each participant randomly picked a seat number as his or her iden-
ti￿cation (ID) number. Participants were only identi￿ed by these ID numbers and not by
their personal identi￿cations throughout our experiments. A seating plan was drawn on
the blackboard at the front of the laboratory for all participants to see. Participants could
also see each other without any obstruction. This was important to make the impact of
public reporting more prominent. An instruction sheet, a series of allocation decision
sheets, a survey form, and an endorsement letter from the bene￿ciary of our experiments
were placed inside an envelope. We placed one envelope on each seat. After all the par-
ticipants had been seated, we read the instructions for the experiment aloud to them.
Participants were not allowed to communicate with each other.
The bene￿ciary of our experiment was Fudan Student Home, a campus-wide charitable
organization that provides support for the less privileged students of Fudan University.
All the donations collected from the experiment went to this charitable organization. The
organization intends to use the money to cover its operating costs and to organize some
activities for the bene￿t of less privileged students.
In our experimental sessions involving the ER plan, we announced the exact amount
of money donated by each participant and his or her ID number after all the participants
had completed their allocation decisions. In our experimental sessions involving the CR
plan, we announced the ID numbers of donors who quali￿ed for star donor status.
Participants in a session had to complete several experimental treatments and make
several allocation decisions in a random sequence to minimize the anchoring e⁄ect.
4 Experimental Results
We mainly focused our analysis on the results obtained from our experiments with the
RMB 20 endowment.6 Table 3 below presents the descriptive statistics of our results.
6We also analyzed the results obtained from our experiments with the RMB 50 endowment and found
that the results were qualitatively similar. For the sake of brevity, we do not present these results in this
11[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
4.1 Comparing Average Contributions across Treatments
As can be seen from the above table, average contributions across treatments with the
RMB 20 endowment were RMB 8:07, which represented about 40% of the endowment.
There were several participants who allocated nothing to recipients, but there were also
participants who gave all their endowment away. In what follows, we compare the average
contributions across treatments.
The NR Plan vs. The ER Plan
From Table 3, we observe that the average contributions under 1_NR20 and 2_ER20
were RMB 9:17 and RMB 8:68, respectively. According to the theory, they should be
equal to, respectively, the optimal size of donations under the NR plan (d0) and the
optimal size of donations under the ER plan (de). We ran the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test for the equality of the means of donations. The p value obtained from the test was
0:7001 (see Table 4 below), implying that there was no signi￿cant di⁄erence between the
two means of donations. This result contradicted the theoretical prediction of the model,
which says that the sizes of donations should be higher under the ER plan than under
the NR plan.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
The NR Plan vs. The CR Plan
We chose several thresholds of category for the CR plan; they were RMB 5, RMB
8, RMB 12, and RMB 16. In theory, the mean of contributions under the CR plan
should be higher than that under the NR plan. We did not, however, ￿nd any supporting
evidence for this theoretical prediction. The average contributions under the CR plan
with the various thresholds were RMB 6:6, RMB 7:48, RMB 8:21, and RMB 8:92,
respectively (see Table 3). The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests for the equality of the
means between any of the CR treatments other than 3_CR20_1 (5 ￿ 20), on the one
hand, and the NR plan, on the other hand, yielded insigni￿cant results (see Table 4). Only
paper. They are, however, available upon request from authors.
12that of 3_CR20_1 (5￿20) produced signi￿cantly lower average contributions. Thus, our
experimental evidence does not lend support to the theoretical prediction.
The ER Plan vs. The CR Plan
From Table 3, we observe that the average contributions under 3_CR20_1 (5 ￿ 20),
3_CR20_2 (8￿20), and 4_CR20_3 (12￿20) were lower than the average contributions
under 2_ER20. Only that of 4_CR20_4 (16￿20) was higher than the latter. Although
these mixed results were in accordance to our theoretical prediction, none of the di⁄erences
was statistically signi￿cant (p values were all larger than 0:05).
The CR Plan vs. The CNR Plan
From Table 3, the pairwise comparisons of average contributions across treatments
yielded: 3_CR20_1 (5￿20) > 6_CNR20_1 (5￿20), 3_CR20_2 (8￿20) < 5_CNR20_2
(8￿20), 4_CR20_3 (12￿20) < 5_CNR20_3 (12￿20), and also 4_CR20_4 (16￿20) >
6_CNR20_4 (16 ￿ 20). The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests presented in Table 4 show
that only the average contributions in 3_CR20_2 (8 ￿ 20) were signi￿cantly less than
those in 5_CNR20_2 (8 ￿ 20). On the basis of our results, it is di¢ cult to draw a
conclusion on whether or not the CR plan dominated the CNR plan.
The Impact of Increasing Category Threshold under the CR and CNR Plans
For the CR plan, we evaluated our results from 3_CR20_1 (5 ￿ 20), 3_CR20_2
(8 ￿ 20), 4_CR20_3 (12 ￿ 20), and also 4_CR20_4 (16 ￿ 20). For the CNR plan, we
evaluated our experimental results obtained from the following treatments: 6_CNR20_1
(5 ￿ 20), 5_CNR20_2 (8 ￿ 20), 5_CNR20_3 (12 ￿ 20), and 6_CNR20_4 (16 ￿ 20).
Our experimental results presented in Table 3 show that when the threshold of cat-
egory was increased, the average level of donations accrued under the CR plan also in-
creased. However, the same pattern was not observed under the CNR plan. The average
level of donations increased when the category was increased from category 1 (4 ￿ 20) to
category 3 (12 ￿ 20), but the level decreased sharply when the category was increased to
category 4 (16￿20). This might suggest that the absence of a prestige channel under the
CNR plan makes the higher category less attractive for donors.
Summary
13Thus, in a nutshell, we have the following results. Firstly, the NR plan yielded a
larger sizes of donation than the ER plan, however the di⁄erence was not statistically
signi￿cant. Secondly, the NR plan yielded larger sizes of donation than the CR plans
(with various category thresholds), however not all of the di⁄erences were statistically
signi￿cant. Thirdly, the CR plans may or may not have dominated the ER plan depend-
ing on the size of the category threshold used. However, the di⁄erences were also not
statistically signi￿cant. Finally, the level of donations under the CR plans may or may
not have been higher than under the CNR plans. Thus, we did not ￿nd any evidence of
the superiority of the CR plan in terms of generating donations.
4.2 Comparing Donation Distributions across Treatments
In what follows, we compared donation distributions across treatments. We plotted the
histograms of donations and their normal density estimates. We also ran Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests to evaluate the equality of distributions. The results of these tests are
shown in Table 5 below.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
The NR Plan vs. The ER Plan
The distribution of contributions under the NR plan and the ER plan are shown
in Figure 2. They exhibit a rather similar pattern. Contributions cluster around several
notable amounts, such as RMB 0, RMB 5, RMB 10, and RMB 20. The mode of the two
distributions is RMB 10. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of distributions
between the two treatments showed that there was no signi￿cant di⁄erence (the p value
was 1:000).
The distribution of contributions under the NR plan and the ER plan are shown in
Figure 2. They exhibit a rather similar pattern. Contributions cluster on several notable
amounts, such as RMB 0, RMB 5, RMB 10, and RMB 10. The mode of the two
distributions is RMB 10. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of distributions
between the two treatments shows that there is no signi￿ncant di⁄erence (the p-value is
1:000).
14Several clusters of donations emerged under the NR plan, which was our baseline
treatment. These cluster points could be considered as the ￿natural focal points￿ and
they captured the warm glow motive for giving. Interestingly, these natural focal points
were also found under the ER plan, suggesting that it was possible that people might not
care about prestige under the ER plan. Otherwise, the two distributions would have had
di⁄erent patterns. However, it could also have been that the ER plan did not provide
any, or enough, prestige bene￿ts to donors, and consequently they might have ignored
the existence of the ER plan and donated according to the natural focal points. Another
possible interpretation would be that donors might have felt ￿uncomfortable￿with having
the exact size of their donation reported, and might have chosen to ignore the ER plan
altogether. This might account for the fact that few charities actually use the ER plan in
practice.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
The NR Plan vs. The CR Plan
We ran between-subject analyses comparing the NR treatments and the CR treatments
under various category thresholds. The distributions of contributions under all these CR
treatments are depicted in Figure 3. When we compared Figure 2 and Figure 3, in general
we observed that there was a shift in the mode of donations under the CR treatments
from a natural focal point into the category threshold. When the category threshold was
set at category 1 (RMB 5), which is also one of the natural focal points under the NR
plan, the majority of donations were clustered around this threshold. Interestingly, other
clusters of donations around the remaining natural focal points under the NR plan became
less prominent in our CR treatments. The result from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test also
showed that the two distributions were statistically di⁄erent (the p value is 0:014).
Recall that the theory predicted that when the category was set too low (such that
db < d0), donors would ignore the category and prefer to donate an amount that was
equal to the amount that would be donated in the absence of any reporting plan. This
size of donation also re￿ ected the warm glow motive for giving. Under 1_NR20, we ￿nd
that the majority of donors donated RMB 10 (see Figure 2), which was higher than the
category threshold of RMB 5. However, under 3_CR20_1 (5 ￿ 20), the majority of
15donors donated RMB 5. Thus, the donors did not really ignore the category as predicted
by the theory. Presumably, they did this because they were attracted by the presence of
prestige bene￿ts under 3_CR20_1 (5￿20). This evidence also suggests that the prestige
motive for giving crowds out the warm glow motive for giving.
When the category threshold was increased to category 2 (RMB 8), the majority of
donations were clustered around this threshold amount, although we still found minor
clusters of donations around other natural focal points (RMB 0, RMB 5, RMB 10, and
RMB 20). The result from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of distributions
between 1_NR20 and 3_CR20_2 (8 ￿ 20) also con￿rmed that they were di⁄erently
distributed (the p value is 0:037).
When we increased the category threshold further to category 3 (RMB 12), the mode
of donation remained equal to the category threshold. However, the number of donors
who donated at the natural donation points also increased. This was the reason for
the insigni￿cant result of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the equality of distributions
between 1_NR20 and 4_CR20_3 (12 ￿ 20). The p value obtained from this test was
0:305. The high value of the category threshold, which constituted about 60% of the total
endowment, discouraged the donors from obtaining star donor status.
When the category threshold was set at category 4 (RMB 16), we still observed a
minor clustering of donations around the threshold amount, although it became much
less prominent. Only less than one third of the participants were attracted to obtain
star donor status. The remaining participants donated an amount that was equal to any
of the natural focal points. If we examine the bottom-right plot depicted in Figure 3,
we observe that donations are evenly distributed across the natural focal points and the
threshold category. This evidence suggests that, when the threshold category is set ￿too
high,￿many donors ignore the prestige bene￿ts. As a result, the contribution patterns in
both treatments are not statistically di⁄erent (the p value is 0:902).
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
Next, we ran probit regressions to evaluate the impact of the CR plan on the probabil-
ity that donations were clustered around the minimum category amount. The results are
presented in Table 6 below. The dependent variable took the value of 1 if the donation
16was equal to the minimum category amount (e.g. RMB 5 for category 1), and the value
of 0 if it did not equal the minimum category amount. The coe¢ cients of the independent
variable (NR dummy) in regressions 1, 2, and 3 were negative and statistically signi￿cant,
implying that the absence of the category plan (under the NR plan) signi￿cantly reduces
the probability of clustering around the minimum amount of the category. However, when
the category was set at RMB 16, only 1 donor out of 47 donors donated at the minimum
category amount. The price of prestige (RMB 16) was deemed too high by the donors.
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
To sum up, although the CR plan did not seem to generate larger size of contribution
from donors than the NR plan, it did change the giving behavior of the donors. The
majority of them did care about having their donations reported by the charity and
obtaining star donor status and prestige bene￿ts. However, when the threshold category
was set equal to category 4, the price of prestige increased substantially and donors would
rather give up obtaining the prestige bene￿ts and preferred to donate according to their
natural focal points.
The CR Plan vs. The CNR Plan
From Figure 4 we can observe that, when the category was set at category 1 (RMB
5), both 3_CR20_1 (5￿20) and 6_CNR20_1 (5￿20) yielded a clustering of donations
around the threshold amount of RMB 5. Recall that the CNR plan o⁄ered no prestige
to donors, as their donations were not publicly reported. It also happens that RMB 5
is one of the natural focal points. The result from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the
equality of distributions between 3_CR20_1 (5￿20) and 6_CNR20_1 (5￿20) showed
that the two distributions were not statistically di⁄erent (the p value is 0:777). Given
that both treatments yielded a similar pattern, we can conclude that in this particular
case the evidence of clustering cannot be attributed to prestige.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE]
Next, when we increased the threshold category from RMB 5 to RMB 8, which is not
a natural focal point but is close enough to a natural focal point (i.e. RMB 10), we could
17see that the two distributions di⁄ered substantially (see Figure 5 below). The p value
obtained from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was 0:051, which indeed con￿rmed that the
two distributions were statistically di⁄erent from one another. Under 3_CR20_2 (8￿20),
the majority of donations were clustered around the threshold category amount (RMB
8). However, under 5_CNR20_2 (8 ￿ 20), the majority of donations were clustered
around the natural focal point of RMB 10. When prestige was o⁄ered under the CR
plan, the behavior of the donors was altered and they tended to donate on the threshold
amount just to qualify for star donor status. However, under the CNR plan which o⁄ered
no prestige, donors were drawn to the natural focal point of RMB 10. Recall that this
point also represented the warm glow motive for giving. This evidence suggests two
things. Firstly, donors are motivated by prestige when donating. Secondly, the presence
of prestige bene￿ts crowds out the warm glow motive for giving.
[INSERT FIGURE 5 HERE]
From a casual observation, when the threshold category was increased further to RMB
12 we observed that under 3_CR20_3 (12 ￿ 20) the mode of the donation distribution
was RMB 12, but under 6_CNR20_3 (12 ￿ 20) the mode was RMB 10, which was a
natural focal point. Donors who wanted to donate RMB 10 under 3_CR20_3 (12￿20)
might have been drawn to the threshold category RMB 12, since their marginal cost
of donating was only RMB 2, but by donating at the threshold amount and qualifying
for star donor status they could obtain the prestige bene￿ts. Interestingly, this did not
happen under 6_CNR20_3 (12￿20), where the prestige bene￿ts were absent. However,
although the mode of the two distributions di⁄ered, the two distributions were not really
statistically di⁄erent. The p value obtained from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was 0:344.
[INSERT FIGURE 6 HERE]
Finally, when the threshold category was increased further to RMB 16, donations
under 4_CR20_4 (16 ￿ 20) became more or less evenly distributed across the natural
focal points and the threshold category (see Figure 7 below). However, under 6_CNR_4
(16 ￿ 20) donors did not seem to care about obtaining star donor status. Only 1 donor
18out of 22 donors contributed RMB 16. The majority of donors ignored the category
and donated nothing or only RMB 5, which was a natural focal point. Presumably, the
spending RMB 16 to obtain prestige was deemed too high a price by the donors. When
the category threshold was set too high, the two distributions did not di⁄er statistically.
The p value obtained from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was 0:378.
[INSERT FIGURE 7 HERE]
The NR Plan vs. The CNR Plan
As shown earlier, the donors ignored the presence of category under the CNR plan
and tended to donate an amount equal to any of the natural focal points. Accordingly,
we should have observed similar patterns of donation distribution under both the CNR
and NR plans. This is because the only thing that di⁄ered between these two plans was
the presence of category. However, unlike the CR plan, the CNR plan did not involve
any public disclosure of donations that quali￿ed for star donor status. Consequently, it
did not enable donors to obtain prestige. If there was any di⁄erence in the donation
distributions between the two plans, it could be attributed to the presence of a reference
point around the size of donation that donors should have made under the CNR plan.
In order to evaluate this, we ran the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the equality of
donation distribution between the two plans. The results are shown in Table 5. In three
out of the four category levels that were used in our experiments (i.e. RMB 8, RMB
12, and RMB 16), we did not ￿nd any statistical di⁄erence in the donation distributions
between the NR and CNR plans. The p values obtained from the tests were 0:696, 0:330,
and 0:081, respectively. On the basis of these results, we can conclude that, without any
public reporting, donors tend to ignore the presence of category and behave in a similar
manner to the one observed under the NR plan. This also implies that there is no evidence
that the use of category creates a reference point concerning the size of donations that
donors should make.
However, for the low level of category threshold (i.e. RMB 5), we did ￿nd evidence
of a reference point e⁄ect. Under 1_NR20, the mode of donations was RMB 10, which
is one of the natural focal points. However, under 3_CNR20_1 (5 ￿ 20), the mode was
equal to the threshold category of RMB 5. Under the CNR plan, the majority of the
19donors were exposed to a choice between donating an amount that they would naturally
have donated in the absence of any category (e.g. RMB 10) and an amount that was
equal to the category threshold. The latter may have given a signal to these donors that
the charity needed a lesser amount of money than they would initially have thought.
Accordingly, many of these donors would have switched from giving RMB 10 to giving
RMB 5.
We also ran probit regressions to evaluate the impact of the use of the category
plan without reporting on the probability of donations clustering around the minimum
category amount. The results are presented in Table 7 below. The dependent variable
took the value of 1 if the donation equaled the minimum category amount (e.g. RMB
5 for category 1), and the value of 0 if it did not equal the minimum category amount.
It can be observed that the impact of the category plan on the probability of clustering
around the minimum category amount is much weaker when the category status is not
publicly disclosed compared to when it is publicly disclosed (see Table 6). The impact is
signi￿cant at the 5% level only in 3_CNR20_1 (5 ￿ 20). In the other two treatment, it
is either marginally signi￿cant or not signi￿cant at all.
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
Summary
To summarize, we found that when prestige bene￿ts were ￿o⁄ered￿ under the CR
plan, and the category threshold was not set too high, donors were attracted to donate
an amount that was equal to the category threshold in an attempt to qualify for star
donor status. This evidence suggests that donors are motivated by prestige when donat-
ing. However, under the CNR plan, where prestige bene￿ts are absent, the majority of
the donors tended to ignore the category and donate an amount that was equal to the
amount donated under the NR plan, which also captured the warm-glow motive for giv-
ing. Interestingly, we found some evidence of the crowding out of the warm glow motive
for giving when prestige bene￿ts were present.
205 Concluding Remarks
There are several reasons why people give their hard-earned money away to charitable
causes. They may be motivated by a sel￿ ess altruistic concern for the well-being of other
people.7 They may also be motivated by the positive utility derived from the act of
donating money to others (i.e. the warm-glow bene￿t of giving) and by other private
bene￿ts of giving.8
In particular, Harbaugh (1998a and 1998b) points out the importance of the ￿prestige￿
donors derive from having their donations made known to others. Given that donors may
be motivated by prestige and that the objective of charities is to maximize the size of
donations, charities can design a fundraising strategy that invests donors with prestige.
Reporting donations by category and awarding donors star donor status is an example of
that fundraising strategy. Using this strategy, charities set some pre-speci￿ed categories
and publicly announce donors who qualify for star donor status on the basis of their
donations. Harbaugh (1998a) showed theoretically that the use of a category reporting
plan could generate more donations than the use of either an exact reporting plan, in which
the actual sizes of donations were reported, or a no reporting plan, in which donations
were kept con￿dential. In a companion paper, Harbaugh (1998b) showed that, under the
category reporting plan, the prestige motive for giving did indeed exist.
This paper presents an experimental analysis of Harbaugh￿ s theoretical assertion.
Through a series of experiments conducted at Fudan University in China, we evaluated
the impacts of various reporting plans on the giving behavior of the donors. Contrary
to Harbaugh￿ s theoretical assertion, our experimental results showed that, in terms of
generating donations, the use of the category reporting plan is not superior to the use of
either the exact reporting plan or the no reporting plan.
However, we did ￿nd strong evidence in support of Harbaugh￿ s suggestion and empiri-
cal ￿nding that donors are motivated by prestige when donating. The use of the category
reporting plan changed the charitable behavior of donors. When given an opportunity to
obtain prestige bene￿ts by having their donations announced and being given star donor
status, donors tended to donate an amount that was equal to the minimum amount that
7See for instance Kolm (1969), Warr (1982), Roberts (1984), and Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986).
8See for instance, Hollander (1990), Glazer and Konrad (1996), and Harbaugh (1998a and 1998b).
21would still enable them to qualify for the star donor status, provided that the category
amount was not set too high. When the category amount was set too high, donors ig-
nored the category. This also suggests that the demand for prestige is downward sloping.
More interestingly, we also discovered that in some circumstances the presence of prestige
bene￿ts crowded out the warm glow motive for giving.
Focal points, which essentially captured the warm glow motive for giving, also played
an important role in the decision of a donor to donate. When the no reporting plan was
used, the donors tended to donate at some natural focal points such as (RMB 0, RMB 5,
RMB 10, and RMB 20). When the category was used, but donations were not publicly
reported, the donation behavior of donors would be similar to the one found under the no
reporting plan, when the category was not set too low. If the behavior had been di⁄erent
in these two settings, it might suggest that the use of category creates a reference point
e⁄ect. Given that we found a similar behavior under the two reporting plans, we can
generally conclude that the use of category does not seem to create any reference point.
However, when the category was set too low, at RMB 5, the presence of category did
induce many donors to donate an amount that was equal to RMB 5, even though their
donations were not publicly reported. In this case, the presence of category may give a
signal to donors that the charity only needs a lesser amount of money than the amount
they initially thought of. Accordingly, many donors switched from giving RMB 10 to
giving RMB 5.
A ￿nal caveat is in order. In our experimental setup, we only used one category for
the CR plan and one for the CNR plan. In reality, charitable organizations use multiple
categories. In future research, it would be interesting to extend our experimental study
to one with multiple categories. On the basis of our result, we expect that the donors
will self-select a donation category that suits them well. Donations are also going to be
























RMB 20 RMB 50
1. No Reporting (NR) NR20 NR50
2. Exact Reporting (ER) ER20 ER50
3 Category Reporting 1 (CR1) CR20_1 (520) CR50_1 (8- 50)
4. Category Reporting 2 (CR2) CR20_2 (8- 20) CR50_2 (20- 50)
5. Category Reporting 3 (CR3) CR20_3 (12- 20) CR50_3 (30- 50)
6. Category Reporting 4 (CR4) CR20_4 (16- 20) CR50_4 (40- 50)
7. Category No Reporting 1 (CNR1) CNR20_1 (5- 20) CNR50_1 (8- 50)
8. Category No Reporting 2 (CNR2) CNR20_2 (8- 20) CNR50_2 (20- 50)
9. Category No Reporting 3 (CNR3) CNR20_3 (12- 20) CNR50_3 (30- 50)
10. Category No Reporting 4 (CNR4) CNR20_4 (16- 20) CNR50_4 (40- 50)
















































Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1. All with RMB 20
endowment
234 8.07 5.41 0 20
2. 1_NR20 23 9.17 5.79 0 20
3 2_ER20 25 8.68 6.24 0 20
4. 3_CR20_1 (5- 20) 25 6.60 4.09 0 18
5. 3_CR20_2 (8- 20) 25 7.48 4.00 0 18
6. 4_CR20_3 (12- 20) 24 8.21 5.44 0 15
7. 4_CR20_4 (16- 20) 24 8.92 6.77 0 20
8. 6_CNR20_1 (5- 20) 22 5.59 4.62 0 18
9. 5_CNR20_2 (8- 20) 22 8.75 3.50 0 15
10. 5_CNR20_3 (12- 20) 22 10.55 4.22 0 18
11. 6_CNR20_4 (16- 20) 22 6.77 7.30 0 20



















Contribution 9.17 8.68 6.6 7.48 8.21 8.92 5.59 8.75 10.55 6.77
1_NR20 9.17 0.7001 0.0501** 0.1355 0.9398 0.8794 0.0174** 0.8582 0.1761 0.0871***
2_ER20 8.68 0.1269 0.2401 0.7003 0.9674 0.0380*** 0.7969 0.0879*** 0.1150
3_CR20_1
(5- 20)
6.6 0.0694*** 0.3814 0.2387 0.2907
3_CR20_2
(8- 20)
7.48 0.4595 0.4356 0.0258**
4_CR20_3
(12- 20) 8.21 0.7154 0.0258**
4_CR20_4
(16- 20) 8.92 0.2656
6_CNR20_1
(5- 20)
5.59 0.0038* 0.0005* 0.4119
5_CNR20_2
(8- 20) 8.75 0.0106* 0.0726***
6_CNR20_3
(12- 20) 10.55 0.0354***
5_CNR20_4
(16- 20) 6.77
The numbers in the above cells denote the p- values obtained from the two- sample Wilcoxon- Mann- Whitney tests for the equality of the means.*
* Significant at the 1% level
** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 10% level


















1_NR20 1.000 0.014** 0.037** 0.305 0.920 0.033** 0.696 0.330 0.081***
2_ER20 0.037** 0.078*** 0.118 0.856 0.033** 0.390 0.134 0.163
3_CR20_1  (5- 20) 0.006* 0.058*** 0.115 0.777 0.000* 0.001* 0.075***
3_CR20_2  (8- 20) 0.027** 0.115 0.019** 0.051** 0.003* 0.046**
4_CR20_3  (12- 20) 0.259 0.043** 0.043** 0.344 0.360
4_CR20_4  (16- 20) 0.102*** 0.185 0.344 0.378
The two- sample Kolmogorov- Smirnov test for the equality of distributions. Thenumbers in the above cells denote the p- values.
* Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level
*** Significant at the 10% level
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Figure 3: The Distribution of Donations under the CR Treatments
26Probit Regressions





1 2 3 4
NR vs. CR1 NR vs. CR2 NR vs. CR3 NR vs. CR4











Observations 46 48 47
Pseudo- R2 0.1420 0.2123 0.1553
Note:
• We compare the following; 1) 1_NR20 vs. 3_CR20_1 (5- 20), 2) 1_NR20 vs.
3_CR20_2 (8- 20), 3) 1_NR20 vs. 4_CR20_3 (12- 20), 4) 1_NR20 vs.
4_CR20_4 (16- 20).
• Standard errors are in parenthesis.
• * Significant at the 1% level.
** Significant at the 5% level.
• + There is only one observation of clustering around the minimum category
amount out of 47 observations, implying that the CR4 plan never induces any
clustering around the minimum category amount. The probit regression
predicts failure perfectly.
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Figure 7: The Distribution of Donations under 4_CR20_4 (16 ￿ 20) and 5_CNR20_4
(16 ￿ 20)
Probit Regressions




1 2 3 4
NR vs. CNR1 NR vs. CNR2 NR vs. CNR3 NR vs. CNR4











Observations 45 45 47
Pseudo- R2 0.1104 0.0999 0.1553
Note:
• We compare the followings; 1) 1_NR20 vs. 3_CNR20_1 (5- 20), 2) 1_NR20 vs.
3_CNR20_2 (8- 20), 3) 1_NR20 vs. 4_CNR20_3 (12- 20), 4) 1_NR20 vs.
4_CNR20_4 (16- 20).
• Standard errors are in parenthesis.
• * Significant at the 5% level.
** Significant at the 10% level.
• + There is only one observation of clustering around the minimum category amount
out of 47 observations, implying that the CNR4 plan never induces any clustering
around the minimum category amount. The probit regression predicts failure perfectly.
Table 7: Probit Regressions - The NR Treatments vs. The CNR Treatments
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